Introduction
The CAESAR competition [2] (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness) has started in March 2014, and its goal is to improve the understanding of the crypto community in the area of authenticated ciphers through a public competition for submitting authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over the widely used AES-GCM [3] . In total, 57 ciphers were submitted to the open call, and in the following three years, through security analysis and investigation of the implementations advantages, it is expected that among these ciphers, a few to be selected in a portfolio of recommended authenticated schemes that are suitable for widespread adoption.
A number of the proposed CAESAR candidates (as well as the benchmark AES-GCM) are based on the current encryption standard: the AES family of block ciphers. The reason for this is twofold. First, the AES has undergone an extensive analysis and is assumed that its security is well understood (or at least better understood compared to all of the remaining unbroken ciphers). Second, AES offers a large software implementation advantage on the latest processor † † The author is with NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Musashino-shi, 180-8585 Japan.
* A preliminary version was presented in SAC 2014 [1] . This is the full version.
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through the so-called AES-NI instruction set, i.e., modern processors have dedicated instructions that allow to reduce the execution time of the AES cipher calls. In general, the CAESAR candidates based on the AES use the block cipher in two ways: either as a whole (or a variant consisting of at least a certain number of rounds), or only its round function. The first type of candidates (OCB [4] , AES-COPA [5] , etc, and AES-GCM) are constructions that require calls to the full 10-round AES-128 (or at least 4-round variants with independent round keys). Usually, they are provable modes based on security reduction to the security of AES, and thus benefit from the current stateof-the-art cryptanalysis of AES-128 [6] . The second type uses only the AES round function and has no strict security proof, i.e., the mode is not provably secure, however, the resistance against common attacks is provided through adhoc techniques. Such candidates (see AEGIS [7] , PAES [8] , Tiaoxin-346 [9] ) benefit from the good security properties and the software performance of the AES round function. They tend to use less than 10 AES round calls per message blocks, and as such are extremely fast.
Our Contributions
We provide a cryptanalysis of the CAESAR candidate PAES [8] and show two attacks that contradict the security claims given by the designers. Common for both of the attacks are the low complexity requirements and the misuse of the AES round function in PAES.
The first attack targets the nonce-repeating mode of PAES (called PAES-8) and is a universal forgery attack of any plaintext with at least 240 bytes. It requires 2 11 time and data complexity to fully recover the internal state and to produce forgery. To launch the attack, we use a special differential trail that can take two different paths. By analyzing the ciphertext difference, the path is uniquely determined and this leads a state recovery based on the differential property of the AES S-Box. Our attack shows that a mere differential analysis (often given by providing the best differential characteristic of a construction) is insufficient for proving security in the nonce-repeating mode, even when the candidates guarantees multiple applications of AES round function.
The second attack comes in a form of a distinguisher for a class of 2 64 weak keys among the total 2 128 keys of PAES. We show that if the attacker can control the nonce, then a single pair of known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext is sufficient to distinguish PAES from an ideal auCopyright c 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers thenticated encryption scheme. The attack exploits the initialization phase of PAES that does not use constants, while the AES round function preserves certain symmetric properties when constants are absent. The results of this paper are summarized in Table 1 .
Organization of the Paper
We recall the design details of the PAES submissions in Sect. 2 and present the universal forgery attack on PAES-8 in Sect. 3. Then, in Sect. 4 we introduce the distinguisher for PAES in the context of weak keys, and we conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
Description of PAES
The family of authenticated encryption (AE) algorithms PAES has been submitted to the ongoing CAESAR competition and consists of two concrete proposals: PAES-4 and PAES-8. As the name suggests, they both use the AES design strategy [10] . The overall computation structure resembles a stream cipher. First, an initialization is computed, i.e. a large state is generated from the key K and the nonce N. Second, the associated data A is injected to the state. Third, it processes the input message and produces the key stream by using a part of the state value, which will be used to compute the ciphertext. Finally, the state is mixed with the associated data length A len and and the message length M len as the finalization process, and 128-bit tag T is produced from a part of the state. The computation structure is illustrated in Fig. 1 . In the paper, for simplicity, we assume that the associated data is always set to empty. Note that our attacks on PAES-8 work equally well when the associated data is not an nonempty string (but our distinguisher on PAES-4 requires the associated data to be empty).
The encryption takes as input a variable-length plaintext, a 128-bit key, a 128-bit nonce and produces a variablelength ciphertext and a 128-bit authentication tag. The decryption takes as input a variable-length ciphertext, a 128-bit key, a 128-bit nonce and a 128-bit authentication tag and produces a variable-length plaintext and a 128-bit authentication tag. If the computed tag matches the received tag, it outputs the plaintext. Otherwise, it outputs decryption failure symbol ⊥. The difference between PAES-4 and PAES-8 lies in the size of the internal state, which amounts to four 128-bit blocks for the former, and eight 128-bit blocks for the latter. A functional difference between these two variants is in the mode: PAES-4 has security claims only in the nonce-respecting mode, while PAES-8 in both, the noncerespecting and nonce-repeating modes.
To simplify the presentation, in the sequel we describe only PAES-8, and only as authenticated encryption. The design resembles a stream cipher: it has an initialization (where the key and the nonce are loaded into the state), then it processes the input message and produces the ciphertext, and finally in the finalization it produces the tag. The internal state S has eight words S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 8 , each of 128 bits, i.e., |S i | = 128, i = 1, . . . , 8. The state update function S tateU pdate(S , M) is the round transformation and uses eight keyless † AES-round calls (denoted further as AES 0 ) to update the state as depicted in Fig. 2. 
Initialization
The 128-bit master key K and the nonce N are loaded into the eight words of the state, the state goes through 10 rounds and at the end the key is XORed to all eight words of the state:
f or i = 1 to 10 † We emphasize that all the AES calls are keyless, that is, composed of SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns (but no AddRoundKey).
S = S tateU pdate(S tate
where L is a linear transformation that operates on the four 32-bit columns a, b, c, d of a 128-bit word a||b||c||d, and is defined as
Processing the Plaintext
In one round, from 16-byte plaintext P i , 16-byte ciphertext C i is obtained with one call to the S tateU pdate function (see Fig. 3 ):
The decryption can be defined accordingly (see Fig. 4 ), where all the state but for S 8 are updated and the plaintext P i is recovered as R i ⊕ C i and then the state S 8 is updated. The initialization, finalization and the tag production is the same as the encryption process. Note that so called Releasing Unverified Plaintext (RUP) is not defined for the decryption. Thus, the recovered P are output only if the tag authentication is successful. Otherwise, the decryption failure symbol ⊥ is output.
Finalization and the Tag Production
Let M len be the 128-bit encoding of the message length. Then, the tag T is produced after 10 rounds of the S tateU pdate function where the message input is set to M len :
Claimed Security of PAES
The claimed security of PAES is given in Table 2 . We emphasize in particular that 128-bit security is claimed for the integrity of PAES in the nonce-repeating mode.
Practical Universal Forgery against PAES-8
In this section, we show a universal forgery attack for PAES-8 in the nonce-repeating mode. The attack works for any plaintext with length of at least 240 bytes, and requires only a small time and data complexity. The steps of the attack can be summarized as follows:
1. Inject differences in two consecutive plaintext blocks such that they cancel in S 8 with a high probability. 2. The ciphertext difference after eight rounds will reveal if the cancellation in S 8 occurred and if so, it will leak information about the state bits. 3. Once the state is recovered, the tag is produced by going through the remaining of the transformations of the (now) public construction.
Differential Trail and Detection of Difference Cancellation
The differential trail used in the attack is given in Fig. 5 . We inject difference Δα in the plaintext P 0 , and try to cancel it with another difference Δβ in the plaintext P 1 . Interestingly, this type of trail has been discussed by the designers of PAES (see [8, Figure 4 .3]), however, they focused on the standard case of propagating the difference through eight rounds and tried to predict it. On the other hand, we use a different approach: our goal is not to predict the difference after eight rounds, but only to detect if the initial differences in Δα and Δβ have canceled.
By injecting the difference Δα and Δβ according to Fig. 5 , the differential trail can take two patterns:
1. The differences Δα and Δβ cancel, thus only the words Both of the differential trails in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , the difference appears from ΔR 7 . This makes the analysis non- trivial to detect the occurrence of the cancellation between Δα and Δβ. In the following section, we explain how to detect the cancellation between Δα and Δβ. We further show the optimal choices of Δα and Δβ.
Choosing Plaintext Differences Δα and Δβ
For an arbitrary difference Δα in the plaintext P 0 , the difference Δβ in the plaintext P 1 should be chosen such that it will cancel Δα and thus will avoid activating the state S 8 . Therefore, Δα and Δβ are chosen so that the cancellation can occur with a high probability -this happens when Δα has only one active byte. Let α and β be the input and output difference transition of the S-Box, i.e., α changes to β with a probability 2 and thus Δα after AES 0 will change to Δβ with probability 2 −6 . We note that the difference α can be located in any of the 16 bytes of the state. The above analysis is depicted in Fig. 7. 
Detecting the Cancellation between Δα and Δβ
We can detect if the cancellation occurred by observing the differences in the ciphertexts C i (or equivalently, the difference in the key streams R i ) after eight rounds. There are two possible cases:
• Cancellation occurred. From the trail on Fig. 5 , it follows that the difference ΔR 8 ⊕ ΔR 7 is obtained when ΔR 7 goes through one AES 0 round. (The focused AES 0 round is stressed by dotted circle in Fig. 5 .) It means that the difference in each of the 16 bytes of ΔR 7 can produce the corresponding differences in the bytes of ShiftRows −1 •MixColumns −1 (ΔR 8 ⊕ΔR 7 ) through the S-Box. We note that the probability of this event is one when the cancellation occurred.
• Cancellation did not occur. If the cancellation did not occur, then there are additional state words with differences (marked with "Δ 0" in Fig. 6 ). In this case, ΔR 8 ⊕ ΔR 7 is obtained when ΔR 7 ⊕ ΔX (where ΔX is the non-zero difference in S 6 ) goes through AES 0 . In contrast to the above case, now ΔR 7 may not be able to produce ShiftRows −1 • MixColumns −1 (ΔR 8 ⊕ ΔR 7 ) through the S-Box. The gap of the probability of this event enables us to distinguish two cases.
Two randomly chosen differences can be matched through the S-Box with a probability 127/256 ≈ 2 −1 . Without loss of generality, we can assume that ΔX is active in all 16 bytes † . Therefore, when Δα and Δβ canceled each other, the probability of a 16-byte match is 1, however, when they do not cancel each other, then the probability drops to 2 −16 . As a result, we can easily distinguish the above two cases, by analyzing ΔR 7 and ΔR 8 .
The same distinguishing method can be applied to 4 additional rounds (see Fig. 8 ). This way, we can increase the probability of distinguishing the two cases, and end up with a very low probability of matching differences through S-Boxes in the case when Δα and Δβ do not cancel. As we apply it to five rounds, the probability becomes 2 −5·16 = 2 −80 .
Recovery of State Words
Assume that Δα and Δβ have canceled (as demonstrated above, we can single out the case when they cancel). It means that we have the input difference ΔR 7 and the output difference ΔR 8 ⊕ ΔR 7 of an active AES 0 for the word S 7 , i.e.,
As in S 7 , all 16 bytes are active (with a probability very close to 1), we can easily find the values of the individual bytes by the well-known method of solving 16 differential equations of the form S(x ⊕ Δ input ) ⊕ S(x) = Δ output that come from the system using S-Box S. Each such equation on average has two solutions, because if x is a solution, then x ⊕ Δ input is also a solution. To find a single solution for each † The difference ΔX is produced after some initial difference goes through multiple AES rounds, thus we can assume ΔX is a random 16-byte difference. As a result, the probability that in ΔX all 16 bytes are active is (1−1/256) 16 ≈ 0.94, which is high enough.
byte, we repeat once the recovery for different Δα and Δβ.
As a result, we can recover the value of S 7 at round 8 of the encryption. Using the very same method, we can recover S 7 at rounds 9, 10, 11 and 12. For instance, for round 9, the input (resp. output) difference of AES 0 is ΔR 7 ⊕ ΔR 8 (resp. ΔR 7 ⊕ ΔR 8 ⊕ ΔR 9 ). With the knowledge of the values of 5 consecutive S 7 , we can uniquely recover the values of S 6 , S 5 , S 4 , S 3 at round 8 by simple computation using those words.
We can recover two more S 7 words (of additional 2 rounds) if we shift the round where we apply the difference Δα. Namely, we introduce Δα at P 2 instead of P 0 and introduce Δβ at P 3 . Hence, we will have the values of S 7 for 7 consecutive rounds.
The state word S 8 is different compared to the remaining seven words and it is not possible to recover it by using the above method. Nevertheless, we can still recover S 8 at round 0 of the encryption based on the differences Δα and Δβ, i.e., we can recover the active byte where the difference Δα is non-zero. By repeating the recovery with 16 different positions of active bytes, we can deduce the whole state word S 8 at round 0. As S 8 does not take feedback from any other word (but the plaintext), we can easily find the value of S 8 at any round, including our target round 8. That is, with the knowledge of S 7 of seven consecutive rounds (8,9,...14) which can be deduced as shown above, and S 8 at round 8, we can recover the full state at round 8.
Attack Procedure
We now present the universal forgery attack. The goal of the attack is to produce a tag of an arbitrary plaintext. In our case, the attack works as long as the length of the plaintext is at least 16 blocks (240 bytes). Our forgery is based on a state recovery, i.e., if at some round the whole state is known, then the tag can easily be produced by performing the remaining operations of the finalization, and therefore it can be produced offline.
Let P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P 14 be the first 15 blocks of the plaintext. Then, the forgery can be described with the following Algorithm 1.
The first loop is used to recover S 8 , and to recover five S 7 , and the second to recover the remaining two S 7 . Note, each of the loops (the inner loop of the first loop) will produce two pairs, as the probability of the trail in the top (Δα will be canceled by Δβ) is 2 −6 . In case no good trails with probability 2 −6 exist, the attacker can switch to ones with probability 2 −7 and run the loops 2 8 times. Furthermore, as we have seen from the previous analysis, a probability of false positives is very low (around 2 −80 ). From the algorithm, it follows that the time complexity of the attack is 16 · 2 7 + 2 7 ≈ 2 11 computations. The data complexity is similar and comes in a form of chosen plaintexts. To solve efficiently the differential equations, the attack needs about 2 16 bytes in memory. Check the same property for additional 4 rounds. 8:
Save the pairs that pass all the above checks. 9:
end for 10:
Recover the byte at position of the state word S 8 at round 0. 11: end for 12: Recover S 7 at rounds 8,9,10,11,12. 13: for i = 1 to 2 7 do 14:
Choose 1-byte difference Δα i and find the corresponding Δβ i . 15:
Query (P 0 P 1 P 2 ⊕ Δα i P 3 ⊕ Δβ i P 4 · · · P 14 ) and obtain the key
Check if the difference R 9 ⊕ R i 9 can result in R 9 ⊕ R i 9 ⊕ R 10 ⊕ R i 10 by AES 0 . 17:
Check the same property for next 4 additional rounds.
18:
Save the pairs that pass all the above checks. 19: end for 20: Recover S 7 at rounds 13 and 14. 21: Deduce all the state words at round 8. 22: Go through the remaining of the transformations and produce the tag.
Practical Distinguisher for a Weak-Key Class of PAES-4 and PAES-8
We continue our analysis by presenting a distinguisher for a class of 2 64 weak keys (out of 2 128 keys) in PAES-8. The distinguisher requires negligible time complexity and only a single pair of known plaintext-ciphertext and a chosen nonce. It exploits the lack of constants in the design and the symmetric properties of the keyless AES round function. We give a thorough description of the distinguisher for the nonce-respecting mode of PAES-8, as well as a brief description of a similar distinguisher for the nonce-respecting mode PAES-4.
Symmetric Properties of the AES Round Function
We first recall the known symmetric property of the AES round function [11] . Namely, if a state is symmetric in the sense that its two halves are equal, then the keyless round function AES 0 of the AES maintains this property. We recall the property of [11] using block matrices, and we introduce the following more general notations:
V(A, B) = A B B A ,

W(A, B) = A B A B .
Additionally, we denote by U, V and W the associated sets respectively for all possible values of the 2×2 block matrices A and B. Finally, we denote M the constant MDS matrix used in the AES round function, and observe that:
Proof. Let S = U(A, B) ∈ U, and write the bytes in S as:
As the SubBytes operation applies the same bijection to all the bytes in the state, we ignore it here as it obviously preserves the structure. After the ShiftRows operation, the state becomes
thus it still belongs to U. Then, the MixColumns operation results in:
Property 2. Let S ∈ W. Then, AES 0 (S ) ∈ V, and AES 0 (AES 0 (S )) ∈ W.
Proof. Let S = W(A, B) ∈ W, and write the bytes in S as:
Again, we ignore the SubBytes operation as the applied bijection preserves the structure of the internal states. However, after the ShiftRows operation the state becomes:
which is transformed by the subsequent MixColumns transformation into the state:
Let X SR −→ X denote that the state X changes to X by the ShiftRows operation. After applying a second keyless AES round, we get:
and by the MixColumns:
which concludes the proof.
Finally, we can represent the action of the keyless AES round function AES 0 on the three sets U, V and W as follows on Fig. 9 . Fig. 9 Action of AES 0 of the symmetrical states from U, V and W.
Symmetric Properties of the PAES Transformations
Along with AES 0 , PAES uses a few more transformations, in particular, the XOR and the linear transformation L. We investigate here how these two transformations preserve the class belongings.
Property 3. Let X be either U, V or W, and let S 1 , S 2 ∈ X. Then, S 1 ⊕ S 2 ∈ X.
Then:
The Distinguisher
To distinguish PAES, we use the first ciphertext C 0 produced during the encryption of an arbitrary plaintext P 0 with a secret key K ∈ W and nonce N ∈ W. The key K can be any of such 2 64 keys (the first two rows equal to the second two rows), and the same structure holds for the nonce N.
Recall the initialization process explained in Sect. 2.1. The state words S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 8 are generated from the key K and the nonce N. In short, K and N are expanded with linear function L and 8 state words are computed by their linear combinations. Then, state update function is applied 10 times and finally K is XORed with all of the 8 state words. We first inspect how the state words S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 8 change the class belongings (either W or V) from the very first to the last steps of the initialization phase:
• K, N ∈ W. By Properties 3 and 4 S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 8 ∈ W after the initial assignments in the initialization.
• After the first update. By Property 3, the XORs do not change the class belongings, thus each S 6 , S 7 , S 8 stay in W after the XORs at the top of the S tateU pdate. Further, according to the Property 2, AES 0 changes the class from W to V. Consequently, at the end of the first update, S i ∈ V, i = 1, . . . , 8.
• The second update is similar to the previous one, but this time the class of S i changes to W. • . . .
• After the tenth update. The classes of all S i are W.
• After the XORs of the key. As each S i is in W and the key is in W, by Property 3, it follows that each S i will be in W.
The propagation of the property during the initialization is described in Fig. 10 . We now focus on the production of the ciphertext C 0 . After the initialization all the state words belong to the class W, thus obviously tmp = S 7 = W(A 1 , B 1 ) ∈ W. Because S 6 , S 7 ∈ W, S 6 ⊕ S 7 also belongs to the class W due to Property 3. After the application of the S tateU pdate, S 7 = V(A 2 , B 2 ) ∈ V by Property 2. Thus, from the definition of the ciphertext C 0 = P 0 ⊕ tmp ⊕ S 7 , we get: Fig. 11 Property propagation in the production of C 0 .
The propagation of the property during the production of C 0 is described in Fig. 11 . As shown in Eq. (1), only by looking the appearance of the matrix, there is no method to detect that the matrix is composed of two matrices; one belongs to the class W and the other belongs to the class V. However, we can still apply some computation to distinguish the non-random behavior. Namely X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z ⊕ T = 0, hence the XOR of the four 32-bit blocks of the first ciphertext and plaintext must result in a zero block. Therefore, we have a distinguisher which requires negligible complexity and only a single block of plaintext/ciphertexts to distinguish PAES when instantiated with any of the 2 64 keys and nonces from the class W. We note that our computer simulation confirmed the correctness of the distinguisher.
Algorithm for Distinguisher
The goal of the distinguisher is determining if the interacting oracle is PAES or ideal primitive (authenticated encryption). The output of the distinguisher is determining bit b ∈ {0, 1}, where b = 1 suggests that the oracle is PAES and b = 0 suggests that the oracle is the ideal primitive. The above distinguisher can be described in an algorithmic form as Algorithm 2. 
Distinguisher for PAES-4
A similar distinguisher can be applied to PAES-4, in which the internal state size is composed of four words. A brief description of PAES-4 is given further.
In the initialization phase of PAES-4, the four state words (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ) are set exactly the same as the first four words of PAES-8. Then, the state is updated five times with the state update function of PAES-4, and finally the key K is XORed to each of the state words. The state update function for PAES-4 is described in Fig. 12 .
We start the analysis by setting K, N ∈ W, which, after the expansion with L and the XOR, makes S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ∈ W. Then, the state update function is applied 5 times, which makes S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 ∈ V. As a result, we end up with a different result than for PAES-8, in which after 10 rounds all state words were in the class W. In fact, this can be a problem for the distinguisher on PAES-4 as after the subsequent XOR of the key K ∈ W, the state words do not belong to a particular class. Nevertheless, as long as the associated data is empty, we can still apply the distinguisher.
After the initialization, the two middle state words are S 2 ⊕ K and S 3 ⊕ K, where S 2 , S 3 ∈ V and K ∈ W. Obviously tmp = S 3 ⊕ K = W (A 1 , B 1 ) ⊕ V(A 2 , B 2 ) . Furthermore, the XOR of two middle state words (just before the application of the AES round to the third word as shown in Fig. 12 ) results in S 2 ⊕ K ⊕ S 3 ⊕ K = S 2 ⊕ S 3 ∈ V, thus after the application of the AES round function, this updated word S new 3 belongs to W. Finally, the key stream can be represented as S new 3 ⊕ tmp = W(A 1 , B 1 ) ⊕ V(A 2 , B 2 ), which yields the same distinguisher as for PAES-8.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown two practical attacks on the CAESAR candidate PAES: a universal forgery attack and a distinguisher, which contradict the security claims of this authenticated encryption scheme.
Our analysis gives insights into possible misuses of the AES round function. Although this transformation per se provides excellent resistance against differential and linear attacks (once it has been iterated several times), by no means it is a sufficient proof of security against all attacks. The designs based on the round function that does not apply any constants, as we have seen on the example of our distinguisher and the chosen-key rotational distinguisher [12] of PAES, are susceptible to attacks that exploit the symmetry of the AES transformations. Consequently, using random constants in such designs should be taken as a requirement to destroy those symmetric behaviors. Furthermore, as our forgery attack shows, evaluating the differential properties in a straightforward manner (providing the best in terms of probability differential characteristic), does not guarantee security against differential attacks in the nonce-repeating mode.
We would also like to emphasize the importance of the technique used in the forgery attack on the nonce-repeating mode. Due to the mode and the attack framework, there is no need to provide a valid tag at the beginning of the attack (forgery or state recovery). Hence the attacker can focus only on finding a differential characteristic that will leak differences in state words sufficient for recovery based on solving differential equations. The characteristic does not necessarily need to hold with a high probability, but for the forgery on PAES this was required in the first two rounds only because there was an alternative path that does not permit state recovery. In general, the probability of the characteristic is irrelevant, however, it is important for the characteristic to leak input and output differences of non-linear operations which subsequently will be used to recover the state bits. We believe that this technique (improved or modified variants) can be a valuable approach for cryptanalysis of other CAESAR submissions and authenticated encryption schemes.
